

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 8 October, 1943 — File No. 3

⑥

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	telegram	Amemb Amman to Sec State (3 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/17	10/8/73	B
2	brief	from PDB (2 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/18	10/8/73	B
3	report	Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Next... (15 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/19	10/8/73	B
4	reports	Spot Reports (31 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/20	10/8/73	B
5	cable	Amemb Amman to Sec State (1 p) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/21	10/8/73	B
6	report	re: UN - Middle East (2 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/22	10/8/73	B
7	cable	Sec State to Amemb Amman (3 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-62/23	10/8/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE			BOX NUMBER	
NSC Files, Harold H. Saunders Files; Middle East Negotiations Files			1173	

FOLDER TITLE

(6) 1973 Middle East War File 3 October 8, 1973

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

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FILE GROUP TITLE			BOX NUMBER	
NSC			1173	
FOLDER TITLE				
(6)				

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MEMORANDUM

S, T R P 73 war

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Information

SECRET

October 8, 1973

4.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY

FROM:

William B. Quandt
Donald Stukel

SUBJECT:

Arab-Israeli Situation Report

Ambassador Keating reports that today will be critical to the Israeli position, as the IDF, now fully mobilized seeks to regain lost ground on the Syrian front. The eventual outcome of the fighting is not in doubt, but the price to be paid for expelling Syrian and Egyptian forces will be high. Already the Israelis have admitted to 35 aircraft lost in suppressing SAM sites in Syria, an unexpectedly large number. The Syrians have apparently captured some of the pilots.

The Egyptians have apparently gained control of the entire east bank of the Canal, with at least 500 tanks having crossed, along with 20-25,000 troops. Israeli air attacks this morning initially concentrated on suppressing SAMs on the western bank of the Canal, a necessary prelude to a counterattack against the Egyptian forces on the east bank. The Israeli Embassy here claims that Israeli armor has crossed to the West Bank of the Canal as part of an encircling move designed to wipe out SAM sites and cut off the Egyptian forces in Sinai. We have little information on this as yet, but it obviously would open a new dimension to the fighting.

Israeli leaders are clearly not pleased with the course of the fighting, although they appear to be confident of the outcome. The Israeli public has not been made aware of the extent of Israeli losses. It appears as if intense fighting will continue today on both fronts.

It is worth noting that neither side has yet attacked population centers or industrial sites, although the Egyptians did try to sink a tanker en route to Eilat with oil from Iran. If the Israelis do succeed in crossing the Canal into Egypt, however, attacks could spread beyond the current lines.

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-2-

Pressures are obviously mounting in Jordan to join the battle, and Jordan has claimed shooting down one Israeli aircraft. Other Arab countries have promised to make contributions, and Iraq has announced it will send troops and aircraft. Morocco has indicated that 3,000 troops are available to be airlifted to the Egyptian front. On balance, it would seem that only Jordan's participation in the fighting is likely to be particularly important, while the other Arab involvement would be less significant.

We still have no reports of attacks on American citizens in any Arab countries. Nor has Soviet activity been of particular concern. Libya has been unusually quiet, with Qadhafi offering money but not troops.

From our perspective today, the most important developments are the following:

- If Israel has crossed to the West Bank of the Canal, the possibility of both sides' accepting the formula of cease-fire status quo ante will increase.
- If Israeli casualties and aircraft losses grow, Israel may resort to unconventional tactics of trying to outflank Syrian forces by going through Lebanon or Jordan, thus risking the broadening of the war. If we hope to keep Jordan out of the fighting, we may have to talk to both Israelis and Jordanians soon.
- Israel will doubtless request some urgent arms deliveries. We should probably hold off for another day, but on a contingency basis look into what can be done rapidly.

DATE OF AMBASSY

SECRET

Department of State

COPY 6 OF 15 COPIES

B was
WH

O 082058Z OCT 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1065
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 7962
BT
S E C R E T STATE 199772

CONTROL: 2 0 0 9Q

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, SY, IS
SUBJ: LEBANESE DEMARCHE
REF: BEIRUT 11884

1. MATTER REFERRED TO REFTEL HAS BEEN TAKEN UP WITH]
ISRAELIS BY SECRETARY.
2. YOU SHOULD NOT RPT NOT INFORM LEBANESE AT THIS TIME.
WE EXPECT TO HEAR BACK FROM ISRAELIS SHORTLY, AT WHICH
TIME YOU MAY BE AUTHORIZED INFORM LEBANESE OF OUR ACTION.
3. WE HAVE INFORMED UK HERE OF ABOVE, SINCE THEY TOO HAVE
RECEIVED A SIMILAR REQUEST. THEY HAVE INSTRUCTED THEIR
EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV TO EXPRESS HOPE ISRAELIS WILL EXERCISE
RESTRAINT IN REGARD TO LEBANON EVEN IF THERE IS PROVOCATION.
KISSINGER

NEA/ARN:DAKORN:BDF
29380 LO/8/73
NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO

S/S-O - MR. WRIGHT

|S/S - MR. BARNES



7.2 was 1/15
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 174

PAGE 01 HAGHDA 00545 081040Z

15
ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT=01 ISD=00 EUR=25 AF=10 IO=15 CIAE=00 DODE=00
NSAE=00 NSCE=00 SSD=00 USIE=00 CCO=00 USSS=00 PM=07
H=03 INR=10 I=03 NSC=10 PA=03 RSC=01 PRS=01 SPC=03
SS=15 ACDA=19 EB=11 COMF=00 SCEM=02 INT=08 TRSE=00
DMD=01 CIEP=02 DRC=01 AID=20 OPR=02 /185 W
045095

P 080957Z OCT 73
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0576

CONFIDENTIAL BAGHDAD 0545

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IZ, US, IR, ENRG
SUBJECT: IRAQI ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF WAR AGAINST ISRAEL

1. ALTHOUGH I HAVE ONLY RADIO ACCOUNTS TO GO BY, PRINCIPAL IRAQI ACTION IN SUPPORT OF EGYPT AND SYRIA AGAINST ISRAEL ARE NATIONALIZATION OF EXXON AND MOBIL PORTION OF RPC; DECISION NOT TO EXPORT OIL TO U.S. AND URGING OTHERS TO DO SAME; PUBLIC OFFER TO IRAN FOR RAPPROCHEMENT; AND PUBLIC ADMISSION THAT 12 HAWKER-HUNTERS ARE IN EGYPT TO ENGAGE THE ENEMY.

2. THESE ACTIONS SHOW CONSIDERABLE INGENUITY IN EXPLOITING WAR SITUATION TO SERVE IRAQI INTERESTS. GIVEN IRAQ'S ISOLATION FROM OTHER ARABS AND THE BATTLEFIELDS, A DRAMATIC ACT WAS REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE ITS CONTINUING ROLE AS AVANT GARDE REVOLUTIONARY. NATIONALIZATION OF LAST REMAINING U.S. INVESTMENT WAS NATURAL CHOICE GIVEN REGIME'S CONVICTION THAT ISRAEL'S STRENGTH AND MILITANCY ARE RESULT OF U.S. BACKING. PARTIAL NATIONALIZATION IS NOT NEW IDEA AND DEPT WILL RECALL IT WAS RAISED AS POSSIBILITY JUST PRIOR TO IPC SETTLEMENT. EVEN THOUGH COMPENSATION PROMISED, IT IS DOUBTFUL REGIME IS AWARE OF POSSIBLE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES NATIONALIZATION

CONFIDENTIAL
11



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 BAGHDA 00545 081040Z

CAN HAVE ON COMMERCIAL DEALINGS WITH U.S. BAN ON OIL EXPORTS TO U.S. FITS IN SAME CATEGORY, BUT HAS LITTLE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

3. REGIME'S OFFER OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH IRAN IN NAME OF MUSLIM SOLIDARITY AND IN ORDER TO DEVOTE FULL ENERGIES TO BATTLE CONFIRMS, IN MY VIEW, THAT IRAQ HAS BEEN WORKING HARD FOR RAPPROCHEMENT BUT WAS UNABLE TO MAKE NEW MOVES WITHOUT LOSING FACE IN VIEW OF IRANIAN DISINTERESTEDNESS AND DISDAINFUL PUBLIC UTTERANCE OF SHAH ABOUT BAGHDAD REGIME. REAL REASON FOR SEEKING RAPPROCHEMENT REMAINS THAT IT IS PREREQUISITE TO RESOLVING KURDISH PROBLEM.

4. COMMENTS WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION NATIONALIZATION, WHICH HARD PRESSED BAATH REGIME PROBABLY SAW AS POLITICAL IMPERATIVE, GOI HAS TAKEN NO ACTION I AM AWARE OF THAT DAMAGE ITS OWN INTERESTS. GIVEN CLEAR INDICATIONS WE HAVE HAD DURING PAST TWO MONTHS OF IRAQI DESIRE FOR AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT, I RECOMMEND DEPT DELAY TAKING ANY IRREVOCABLE POSITION ON EXXON/MOBIL NATIONALIZATION UNTIL FULL FACTS KNOWN. BPC REP WILL OBTAIN DECREE AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS OCT 8.
LOWRIE

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alas

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 877

PAGE 01 JIDDA 04353 091933Z

43/45
ACTION NEA=12

INFO OCT-01 I0-15 ISO-00 AF-10 EUR-25 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 USSS-00
AID-20 FBO-01 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NIC-01 NSC-10
SPC-03 OC-06 QPR-02 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SCA-01 A-01
SCSE-00 OMB-01 SS-15 SY-10 DRC-01 /163 W
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0 081304Z OCT 73
PM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5124
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NIACT IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS JIDDA 4353

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN 4353 VICE 453)

EO 11652: N/A
TAGS: MARR, SA, XF
SUBJECT: STATE OF ALERT ORDERED

ACCORDING TO 1100Z NEWS BROADCAST ROYAL DIWAN HAS ORDERED
STATE OF ALERT FOR ALL ARMED FORCES OF THE KINGDOM.
CONFIRMATION OBTAINED FROM DIRECTOR SAUDI NEWS AGENCY 1300
HOURS Z.
HORAN

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 467

PAGE 01 STATE 199788

73
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-73 TSO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
USSS-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:BDF
APPROVED BY NEA:JJS1SCO
SAS - MR. BARNES

082202Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 199788

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, XF
SUBJ: BRITISH CONVERSATION WITH HAFEZ ISMAIL

1. BRITISH EMBASSY HEAD OF CHANCERY GRAHAM PHONED ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO MORNING 2420Z 8 OCT 73 ON BEHALF LORD CROMER TO PASS REPORT JUST RECEIVED OF COMMUNISATION BETWEEN BRITISH AMBASSADOR ADAMS IN CAIRO AND HAFEZ ISMAIL. GRAHAM SAID ADAMS SPOKE ALONG LINES OF WHAT PARSONS HAD TOLD AMBASSADORS IN LONDON, T.E. THAT UK CONTINUES TO ABHERE TO RESOLUTION 242 AND OTHER APPROPRIATE INITIATIVES. ADAMS TOLD HAFEZ ISMAIL CURRENT FIGHTING ONLY UNDERLINES NEED FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 242. UK ONLY WANTS BRING FIGHTING TO AN END AND FEELS THIS IS NO TIME FOR POST MORTEMS OR ASSESSMENT OF BLAME; ONCE FIGHTING HAS BEEN STOPPED WE COULD SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. ADAMS ADDED THAT AS UK SEES THINGS, IT IS ESSENTIAL FIGHTING BE STOPPED BOTH FOR

HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KRAMER _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELD _____
V.I.G. _____
WALSH _____

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PAGE 02 STATE 199788

HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND TO PREVENT ENTRY OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND CONSEQUENT BROADENING OF AREA OF HOSTILITIES.

2. GRAHAM SAID HAFEZ ISMAIL'S RESPONSE TO ADAMS WAS THAT WHILE HE RESPECTED UK'S HUMANITARIAN OUTLOOK AS FAR AS ARABS WERE CONCERNED, THEY WOULD PREFER THAT HOSTILITIES NOT BE RESTRICTED TO CURRENT ZONES (GRAHAM COMMENTED IMPLICATION OF THIS APPEARS TO BE THAT EGYPT WOULD LIKE JORDAN TO JOIN IN). HAFEZ ISMAIL SAID THERE ARE DISTURBING REPORTS OF MOVEMENTS OF U.S. SIXTH FLEET INTO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND OF VOLUNTEERS ARMING IN ISRAEL.

3. GRAHAM SAID THAT IN GENERAL HAFEZ ISMAIL APPEARED TO TAKE ADAMS' REMARKS WELL. HAFEZ ISMAIL INDICATED EGYPT READY TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE, BUT ONLY ON "CERTAIN CONDITIONS" WHICH HE DID NOT DEFINE. ADAMS GOT IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS MORE FLEXIBILITY IN HAFEZ ISMAIL'S REMARKS THAN HAD BEEN REFLECTED IN EARLIER REMARKS BY SADAT, WHO HAD REFUSED CONSIDER IDEA OF CEASEFIRE. BRITISH THOUGHT EGYPTIAN READINESS TO HAVE A CEASEFIRE WOULD GROW IF THINGS DO NOT GO WELL. KISSINGER

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #11

Situation in the Middle East as of 1600 Hours (EDT), Oct. 8, 1973

S/S(3)

S/S-E

S/S-M

S/S-S

S/PC

SEA

ED

EUR

IO

AF

S/PRS

A/WLG

PM

INR

WH(LDS)

DOD(LDX)

CIA(LDX)

NSA(LDX)

Israel now claims that the Syrians are in general retreat toward the ceasefire lines. Israel claims that its offensive against the Egyptians is going well, including air superiority, but it appears that the major Israeli thrust against the Egyptians has not been mounted yet. In any case, Israel has yet to mount major air or ground attacks against Egypt's air defense system west of the Canal and instead has concentrated its efforts against the Egyptians on the Canal's east bank, particularly in the northern Canal area.

The pressures mount steadily on those Arab countries which would prefer to stay out of this war. Saudi Arabia, which has put its forces "on alert", feels that prolonged hostilities, or Jordanian involvement, would force it into some kind of activism. Israeli reports of numerous (some eight incidents) rocket and mortar attacks from Fedayeen on Lebanese territory pose a serious danger to Lebanon of Israeli reprisals; it will be still more dangerous when Israeli forces are free to deal with these nuisance attacks. The pressures on King Hussein remain as they have been from the beginning, made more severe by the passage of time and continuing Syrian and Egyptian claims of success.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

APPROVED BY:

Donald M. Wright
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #11

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S/S(3)

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WH(LDS)

DOD(LDX)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

APPROVED BY:

Roderick M. Wright

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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
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73 war

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 338

PAGE 01 USUN N 03710 081715Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 ANDERSON _____

HOLDRIDGE _____

HORMATS _____

JORDEN _____

KENNEDY _____

LEHMAN _____

LEVINE _____

NEGRONI _____

ODEEN _____

RATLIFF _____

RONDON _____

SAUNDERS _____

SONNENFELD _____

V.I.G. _____

WALSH _____

081615Z OCT 73 046510

FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9955

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 3710

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR XX XF SC UN

SUBJ: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON MIDDLE EAST


1. SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT MCINTYRE TOLD US AT NOON THAT OUR LETTER REQUESTING SC MEETING IS STILL ONLY DOCUMENT ON SUBJECT RECEIVED AND TO BE CITED IN DRAFT AGENDA. US IS ONLY SPEAKER INSCRIBED AND NONE OF PARTIES HAS REQUESTED RIGHT TO APPEAR.

2. THERE HAS BEEN RUMOR (WHICH MAY HAVE ORIGINATED AS SPECULATION AMONG WEO'S) THAT MEETING WOULD BE ABORTED BY COUNCIL REJECTION OF AGENDA. HOWEVER, MCINTYRE HAD BEEN TOLD LATE IN MORNING BY INDONESIAN PPRM REP SANI (WHOSE WORD MCINTYRE TRUSTS) THAT NO SUCH MOVE IS AFLOAT AMONG NONALIGNED. RUSSIANS KEEP ASKING US WHAT OUR PLANS ARE, IMPLYING THEIR EXPECTATION MEETING WILL GO FORWARD.

3. MCINTYRE SAID SOME MEMBERS OF SC WOULDERED WHETHER IN ABSENCE OF REQUEST FROM PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE, COUNCIL SHOULD INVITE THEM TO PARTICIPATE. WE WILL PLAY THIS ONE BY EAR, AVOIDING CONTENTION AND KEEPING IN MIND THAT WE ARE NOT IN A HURRY AND WILL SEEK TO MAINTAIN STATELY PACE.

4. AFTER ABOVE DRAFTED, MCINTYRE ADDED THAT SYRIA HAS NOW SUBMITTED LETTER ASKING TO PARTICIPATE AND ISRAEL EXPECTED TO DO SO SHORTLY.

5. IT REMAINS POSSIBLE THAT THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING WILL



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 USUN N 03710 081715Z

CONSIST SOLELY OF ADOPTION OF AGENDA AND SPEECH BY US, WITH
ADJOURNMENT THEREAFTER.

SCALI

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73 war
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 314

PAGE 01 LONDON 11595 081628Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

026 W

P R 081621Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4596
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET LONDON 11595

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, UK, EG, IS
SUBJECT: LATEST BRITISH VIEWS ON ME
REF: CAIRO 2987; 2989

046360
ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROFONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDN _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELD _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

1. ACCORDING TO FCO'S CRAIG, OCTOBER 8, ASST SECRETARY SISCO HAS BEEN SHOWN CABLE FROM BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO WHICH REPORTED SADAT NOT RPT NOT WILLING ACCEPT CEASEFIRE UNTIL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BACK UNDER EGYPTIAN CONTROL. CRAIG TOLD US REPORT DID NOT RPT NOT CONTAIN EXPRESSION SADAT'S WILLINGNESS COMPLY WITH CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION BY SC (PER PARA 3 CAIRO 3987) UNTIL FULL TERRITORIAL GOAL ACHIEVED.
2. ONLY IMPLICATION OF SUCH CEASEFIRE BEING ACCEPTED WOULD BE IN CONTEXT OF ISRAEL AGREEING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE TO SETTLE ME, WHICH CRAIG DISMISSED AS NON-STARTER.
3. WE UNDERSTAND US AND UK DELEGATIONS MET THIS MORNING

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SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 11595 081628Z

IN NEW YORK. CRAIG SAID BRITISH BELIEVE A CEASEFIRE URGENTLY NEEDED BECAUSE OF THREE PRIME DANGERS IF WAR CONTINUES:

(A) JORDAN MAY BE SUCKED INTO WAR;
(B) LEBANON MAY BECOME INVOLVED THROUGH ISRAELI COUNTER-ACTION AGAINST PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN WHOSE ACTIVITIES LEBANESE CANNOT CONTROL; AND
(C) CONTINUING POSSIBILITY OF SPORADIC TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST ME OIL INSTALLATIONS AS OCCURRED IN 1967.

4. CRAIG ALSO SAID FRENCH ARE KEEPING THEIR HEAD DOWN. THEY REFUSED TO JOIN BRITISH IN SUPPORTING CALL FOR SC SESSION THOUGH STATING THEY WOULD NOT OBJECT TO ONE.

ANNENBERG



73 war
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 182

PAGE 01 TEL AV 07847 081042

14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00
CCO-00 1026 W

0081041Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0017
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

SECRET TEL AVIV 7847

EXDIS

DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED

E 0 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, XF
SUBJECT: THE FOURTH ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

REF: TEL AVIV 7816 (NOTAL)

045146

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORNATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGRO. DOTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

10-B

1. AS WE MOVE INTO THE THIRD DAY OF THIS WAR, I BELIEVE IT IS
STILL FAIRLY CERTAIN TO SAY THAT ISRAEL IS GOING TO WIN IT.

2. TODAY IS PROBABLY THE CRITICAL DAY. IDF, WHICH MUST PUSH
BACK SYRIANS BEFORE IT CAN FOCUS ON EGYPTIAN FORCES EAST OF
SUEZ CANAL, FACES SERIOUS ZDS#ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. IF

THE CLOUDY WEATHER WHICH PREVAILS THIS MORNING SHOULD INHIBIT THE USE
OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE TO FULL EFFECT AGAINST THE SYRIAN
ARMOR, THE ISRAELI GROUND FORCES COULD HAVE THEIR HANDS
FULL, SINCE MOBILIZATION STILL ONGOING AND REINFORCEMENTS ARE
NOT ALL IN PLACE. AS A RESULT, THE WAR COULD LAST LONGER AND
COULD COST MORE THAN WE HAD THOUGHT YESTERDAY.

3. ONE THING IS BECOMING CLEAR: ISRAELI CASUALTIES ON
BOTH FRONTS ARE MOUNTING. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS FACTOR IS
IMPLIED IN THE FACT THAT THE GOI IS NOT TELLING ITS PEOPLE

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SECRET
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07847 081104Z

ABOUT IT (NOR IS IT GIVING US HARD INFO ON THE SUBJECT). I BELIEVE THAT WHEN THE FULL IMPACT IS FELT IN ISRAEL ON THE BLOOD THIS WAR WILL HAVE COST, THE GOI'S POLITICAL OPTIONS MAY BE REDUCED: THE NATION WILL EXPECT A DECISIVE WAR OUTCOME AND A POSTWAR SITUATION WHICH LOOKS SECURE FOR ISRAEL.

4. ANOTHER THING WHICH THE GOI IS SHIELDING ITS PUBLIC FROM IS THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE DIFFICULTIES THE IDF IS FACING, OBVIOUSLY THE GOI'S FIRST CONSIDERATION IN DOING SO IS THE MAINTENANCE OF MORALE. A SECONDARY CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE JORDAN: SURELY THE ISRAELIS APPRECIATE THAT JORDAN (WITH MEMORIES OF 1967) DOES NOT BELIEVE SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN MILITARY COMMUNIQUES AND IS MORE INCLINED TO ACCEPT THE ISRAELI VERSION AS ACCURATE. KEEPING JORDAN OUT OF THE WAR MUST BE HIGH ISRAELI PRIORITY.

5. AS SOON AS WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF HOW LONG THE WAR IS GOING TO LAST AND WHAT IT IS GOING TO COST ISRAEL, WE WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO JUDGE THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE USG CAN USEFULLY SEEK TO GUIDE ISRAELI POLICY.
KEATING

NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED, WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

REF ID: A65124
S E X D E X
S E X D E X



Department of State

To war
TELEGRAM

SECRET 348

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 11923 081732Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 CCO-00

1026 W

046453

O R 081625Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4637
USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPANTE _____
ODCEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

R-B

SECRET BEIRUT 11923

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: XX
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

1. KUWAIT'S 3690 PERFECTLY STATES BASIC POINT I TRIED TO MAKE IN URGING SUPPORT FOR STANDSTILL CEASEFIRE. PREVIOUSLY WE INSISTED THAT ISRAELIS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO RETURN TO OLD ARMISTICE LINE AND THAT ISRAEL HAD RIGHT TO RETAIN AT LEAST SOME ARAB TERRITORY GAINED BY CONQUEST IN 1967. SHOULD WE NOW INSIST ON RESTORATION STATUS QUO ANTE WHILE ARABS HAVE REOCCUPIED SOME OF THEIR OWN TERRITORY, WE WOULD BE SAYING ISRAELIS CAN KEEP ARAB TERRITORY TAKEN BY FORCE BUT ARABS HAVE NO RIGHT TO RETAIN THEIR OWN TERRITORY EVEN WHEN THEY HAVE RETAKEN IT.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 11923 081732Z

2. RESPONSIBLE LEBANESE WITH WHOM WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH BELIEVE US AND ONLY US HAS STRONG ENOUGH POSITION WITH BOTH SIDES TO TRANSFORM CURRENT CHAOS INTO PERMANENT PEACE SETTLEMENT. THEY BELIEVE WE HAVE BEEN RESTRAINED AND OBJECTIVE IN OUR PUBLIC COMMENTS SO FAR AND NOTE THAT, IN TURN, EGYPT AND SYRIA HAVE GIVEN US REASONABLE TREATMENT IN THEIR PUBLIC MEDIA DURING PRESENT ROUND.

3. CONSENSUS OF OPINION AMONG THESE LEADERS IS THAT WITH SURPRISING DEMONSTRATION OF MILITARY ABILITY AND COURAGE BY EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS OVER LAST TWO DAYS, ARABS HAVE REGAINED THEIR SELF-ESTEEM, NO LONGER FEEL HUMILIATED AND WOULD NOW GO TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH A DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL SUPPORT THAT WOULD PERMIT THEM TO ENGAGE IN MEANINGFUL PEACE DISCUSSIONS.

4. HOWEVER, SHOULD USG APPEAR TO RALLY TO ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW FOR EXAMPLE BY LINKING CEASEFIRE TO RETURN TO STATUS QUO ANTE, USG WILL IMMEDIATELY BE CONDEMNED BY ARABS, SACRIFICE ITS PRESENT STANDING, AND THEREBY LOSE WHAT MAY BE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING ABOUT REAL PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. WE WOULD PROBABLY PAY HIGH NATIONAL PRICE IN THE PROCESS, AS EMBASSY KUWAIT SUGGESTS.

5. FINAL POINT WHICH DESERVES MENTION IS FACT THAT, AT LEAST ON EGYPTIAN FRONT, FREEZING CEASEFIRE LINES AS OF TODAY, WOULD STILL NOT RPT NOT DENY ISRAELIS ANY ARAB TERRITORY THEY APPEAR TO COVET AS ESSENTIAL FOR SECURITY IN FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT. AS FAR AS I AM AWARE, EVEN WITH ALL THEIR HOPES OF HOLDING PARTS OF SINAI AND SHARM AL SHAYKH, GOI HAS NOT CONTEMPLATED EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT TO ISRAELI RETENTION OF EAST BANK OF CANAL.

BUFFUM

SECRET

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73 war
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 318

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05360 081646Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

USSS-00 /026 W

046357

0081531Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9625
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SCHNEIDERFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

SECRET AMMAN 5360

EXDIS

DEPT PASS DIA INFO IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, EG, IS
SUBJ: SADAT'S VIEW ON CEASE FIRE

1. HAVE JUST RETURNED, FLYING FROM TABUK WITH JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO CAIRO ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI. LATTER WAS DESPATCHED BY SADAT TO TALK TO KING. ACCORDING RIFAI, SADAT HAS LEARNED THAT USG IS PLANNING TO PUSH FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND RETURN TO STATUS QUO ANTE AND HE CONSIDERS THIS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO EGYPT. RIFAI PLANS TO DISCUSS THIS WITH KING.

2. RIFAI LEFT CAIRO EARLY THIS MORNING AND IS OUT OF TOUCH WITH WHAT HAPPENED TODAY. HE WILL BE REPORTING TO KING THAT SADAT AND EGYPTIAN MILITARY BELIEVE THEY HAVE WON IMPORTANT VICTORY AND THAT THEY CANNOT BE PUSHED BACK ACROSS THE CANAL. HE WILL ALSO SAY THAT SADAT HAS LARGE ADDITIONAL FORCES WHICH HE PLANS TO PUT INTO BATTLE TODAY AND TOMORROW. EGYPTIAN

SECRET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 05360 081646Z

MILITARY BELIEVE THEY HAVE STRENGTH TO PUSH WELL INTO SINAI AND ARE URGING THIS ON SADAT. ALL OF THIS OPTIMISM MAY HAVE THE WRONG SORT OF EFFECT ON KING. I WILL SEE HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BROWN

ADDRESS INDEX

SECRET

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73 *me*
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 379

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05363 081848Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 150-00 CCO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
0 081730Z OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9627

SECRET AMMAN 5363

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, JO
SUBJ: COOLING OFF THE KING

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELD _____
V.I.G. _____
WALSH _____

1. I WILL SEE KING AND PM IN MORNING.

2. SEND ME A FLASH CABLE TIMED FOR ABOUT 0700 ZULU SETTING FORTH OUR VIEWS. MAKE IT CANDID. GIVE ME THE LATEST INFO AND FACTS I NEED TO COOL HIM OFF IF, AS I SUSPECT, THE OTHERS ARE GETTING TO HIM WITH THEIR APPEALS FOR JORDANIAN INTERVENTION. DON'T FORGET HOW HE ACTED IN 1967 EVEN WHEN HE KNEW IN HIS HEART THAT IT WOULD BE A HOPELESS GESTURE. *px*

3. IF WE WANT TO BE MILDLY THREATENING, I'LL DO IT.

4. LET ME HAVE AS WELL HOW WE SEE APPEAL FOR CEASEFIRE GOING. IF NEWS IS SUCH THAT HE WON'T LIKE IT, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO TELL HIM NOW THAN TO LET HIM HEAR IT FROM THIRD PARTIES WHO DO NOT HAVE SAME INTERESTS THAT WE DO.
BROWN



73_{1a}
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 387

PAGE 01 USUN N 03712 081902Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

1026 W

O R 081849Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9957
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET USUN 3712

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: UN, XF, UK, PFOR
SUBJ: ME IN SC: UK DRAFT RES

046771 ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V.I.G. _____
WALSH _____

L

OK draft

1. UKUN (STRICTLY PROTECT) HAS PASSED US LANGUAGE WHICH
LONDON HAS PROPOSED AS POSSIBLE BASIS FOR COMPROMISE SC RES.
BRITISH HAVE NO INTENTION OF TABLING BEFORE OCTOBER 9, AND *OK*
THEN ONLY AFTER CONSULTING WITH USG. THEY ASKED,
IN RETURN, THAT US CONSULT WITH HMG BEFORE INTRODUCING
RES OF ITS OWN.

2. FOLLOWING IS GIST OF BRITISH DRAFT:

SC WOULD CALL FOR "IMMEDIATE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES IN
ORDER TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH RAPID PROGRESS COULD BE
MADE TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SC
RES 242."

3. NUMBER OF SC MEMBERS, INCLUDING FRENCH, ARE PREDICTING
FOLLOWING SC SCENARIO: US WILL TABLE RES CALLING FOR
CEASE-FIRE IN CONJUNCTION WITH RETURN TO OCTOBER 6 LINES,
NON-ALIGNED WILL RESPOND BY CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL TO
JUNE 67 BOUNDARIES, LATTER RES WILL OBTAIN MAJORITY, AND
US WILL VETO. IT IS THIS OUTCOME THAT UK DRAFT IS DESIGNED
TO AVOID.

SCALI

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73 way

ROUTINE
DTA772
DE RUEHDT #3741 2820330
R 090257Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9986

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USE USUN 3741
E.O. 11652: NA
TAGS: UN XF PFOR SC
SUBJ: SC CONSULTATIONS ON EGYPTIAN REQUEST FOR REMOVAL OF
UN OBSERVERS

UN on
Egyptian request
for UNTSO transfer

1. FOLLOWING SC MEETING ON ME, SC PRESIDENT MCINTYRE CALLED
FOR CONSULTATIONS TO DISCUSS EGYPTIAN GOVT'S REQUEST FOR
TRANSFER OF UN MILITARY OBSERVERS FROM THEIR POSTS TO CAIRO.
(SEE SEPTEL, TRANSMITTING EGYPTIAN LETTER CONTAINED IN UN
DRC S/11013, 8, OCT 1973).

2. SC PRESIDENT (MCINTYRE OF AUSTRALIA) STATED MEETING OFF BY
CALLING ATTENTION OF ALL MEMBERS TO URGENCY WITH WHICH SYG
VIEWED EGYPTIAN REQUEST. SYG HAD ASKED SC MAKE NECESSARY
ARRANGEMENTS TO EFFECT REMOVAL OF UN OBSERVERS TO CAIRO TO ENSURE
THEIR SAFETY. SC PRESIDENT THEN ASKED FOR VIEWS OF MEMBERS OF
SC, SAYING HE REALIZED INSTRUCTIONS FROM GOVTS MIGHT BE NECESSARY.
SUDAN BEGAN BY POINTING OUT IMPORTANCE OF WORDING IN PARA 3 OF
LETTER CALLING FOR TRANSFER ONLY (NOT REMOVAL) AND SAID THAT
SUDAN WOULD AGREE WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH HUMANITARIAN REQUEST OF
EGYPTIAN GOVT. CHINESE REMINDED SC OF THEIR POSITION ON MILITARY
OBSERVERS IN GENERAL, BUT STATED THAT SINCE REQUEST MADE BY
EGYPTIAN GOVT CHINA WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION. IN VIEW INSECURITY
OF PRESENT POSITIONS AND QUESTIONABLE USEFULLNESS OF OBSERVERS
IN THOSE POSITIONS, KENYA SUPPORTED EGYPTIAN REQUEST.

3. MALIK (USSR) STATED THAT NO MEMBER NEEDED SEEK INSTRUCTIONS
AND ALL SHOULD BE ABLE AGREE TO SUPPORT REQUEST OF EGYPT IN
VIEW OF URGENCY OF REQUEST AND DANGEROUS PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES
IN AREA. HE THEREFORE ASKED PRESIDENT TO REPORT TO SYG THAT
SC TOOK NOTE OF HIS LETTER AND AGREED TO EGYPTIAN REQUEST.
GUINEA GAVE UNRESERVED SUPPORT TO EGYPTIAN REQUEST. INDONESIA
AGREED TO REQUEST, BUT ASKED WHETHER SYG HAD RECEIVED PERSONAL

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TOR:282/03:45Z DTG:090257Z OCT 73

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OPINION OF UN CHIEF OF STAFF IN EGYPT, INDIA, PANAMA, YUGOSLAVIA AND PERU ALL AGREED WITH EGYPTIAN REQUEST. ONLY INTERVENTION REQUESTING FURTHER INFORMATION WAS MADE BY US (SCHAUFELD) WHO REQUESTED UN ASSESSMENT OF NEED TO TRANSFER OBSERVERS. HE NOTED LACK OF CURRENT READING FROM CHIEF OF STAFF AS TO IMMINENT DANGER TO OBSERVERS, HOW MANY IN FACT HAD ALREADY BEEN WITHDRAWN ON AUTHORITY OF CHIEF OF STAFF, ABSENCE OF REQUESTS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IN AREA, POSSIBILITY OF GUARANTEES BY BELLIGERENTS FOR SECURITY OF OBSERVATION POSTS WHOSE LOCATIONS ARE WELL KNOWN, ETC. SCHAUFELD FINALLY NOTED THAT BATTLELINES IN FIGHTING CHANGE SO RAPIDLY THAT IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO DISCRETION OF CHIEF OF STAFF HIMSELF TO DETERMINE SECURITY NEEDS OF HIS PERSONNEL, AND SAID SC SHOULD EXAMINE HIS REPORT PRIOR TO COMMITTING ITSELF.

4. UK STATED THAT GIVEN URGENT HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS, BRITISH QUITE PREPARED TO ACCEPT JUDGMENT OF SYG ON SITUATION BUT HOPED HE WOULD FORM JUDGMENT IN CONSULTATION WITH CHIEF OF STAFF UNTSO. AS A COMPROMISE, FRANCE SUGGESTED REPORT STATING SC HAD NO OBJECTION TO SYG RESPONDING AFFIRMATIVELY TO EGYPTIAN REQUEST AFTER CONSULTATION WITH CHIEF OF STAFF AS TO WHERE NEW OBSERVER POSTS SHOULD BE LOCATED. HOWEVER, THIS WAS BATTED DOWN BY KENYA, FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY USSR, WHO STATED THAT IN EFFECT SC WOULD BE GIVING CHIEF OF STAFF VETO POWER OVER REQUEST OF MEMBER STATE AND REMINDED SC THAT OBSERVERS TOOK UP POSTS ONLY AFTER AGREEMENT OF MEMBER STATE.

5. AT THIS POINT IN MEETING, URQUHART (UN) ENTERED MEETING AND SAID THAT FULL REPORT FROM CHIEF OF STAFF WAS ON ITS WAY TO UN HQTS AND WOULD BE READY BY MORNING. URQUHART RESPONDED TO US QUESTION BY SAYING THAT IN FACT SOME OBSERVERS HAD ALREADY BEEN REMOVED ON AUTHORITY OF CHIEF OF STAFF.

6. IT WAS THEN AGREED THAT PRESIDENT WOULD REPORT TO SYG FACT THAT NO AGREEMENT REACHED, BUT THAT MAJORITY OF SC AGREED WITH EGYPTIAN REQUEST TO TRANSFER OBSERVERS TO CAIRO. SYG WAS TO BE TOLD FURTHER CONSULTATION WAS NECESSARY, AND AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF UN REPORT FROM FIELD.

7. COMMENT: AFTER MEETING URQUHART CONFIRMED TO SCHAUFELD THAT TWO OBSERVATION POSTS ARE STILL MAINTAINED AND NOBODY IN DANGER. URQUHART FURTHER STATED THAT ORIGINAL EGYPTIAN REQUEST WAS COUCHED IN EXTREMELY HARSH LANGUAGE AND WAS RETURNED SO THAT IT COULD BE MODERATED. URQUHART'S PRIMARY POINT TO SCHAUFELD WAS THAT SC SHOULD EXERCISE CAUTION LEST ACTION BE TAKEN BY SC THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE EVENTUAL RETURN OF OBSERVERS TO THEIR POSITIONS.

SCALI
BT

PSN:051989 PAGE 02

TDR:282/03:45Z DTG:090257Z OCT 73

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***** C L A S S I F I E D ***** S C O P Y

73 way

PRIORITY

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P 090711Z OCT 73

FM USMISSION USUN NY

To SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 999
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 967
USMISSION ANTO PRIORITY 5173
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 4411
AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY 642
AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 1737
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 609
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 4102
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 9155
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 568
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 3626
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY 3482
AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM PRIORITY 2065
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4225
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 239
AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 090
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 139
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 197
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY 229
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 761
ZFN/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
ZFN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
ZFN/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
ZFN/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
ZFN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
ZFN/AMEMBASSY OSLO
ZFN/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
ZFN/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
ZFN/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
ZFN/AMEMBASSY VIENNA
ZFN/IAEA VIENNA

UNSC - 10/8

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 6 USUN 3752

E. O. 11652 N/A

TAGS: OGEN

SUBJ: USUN UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY NO 15
SECURITY COUNCIL--MIDDLE EAST

PSN:052421 PAGE 01

TDR:282/12:26Z DTG:090711Z OCT 73

***** UNCLAS SECTION 1 ***** S C O P Y

***** C L A S S I F I E D *****S COPY

SC CONVENED AT 6:00PM OCT. 8, AT US REQUEST, TO CONSIDER MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, AND HEARD STATEMENTS BY US, EGYPT, CHINA, ISRAEL, UK AND USSR. SC PRES MCINTYRE (AUSTRALIA) CALLED ATTENTION TO SYG'S LETTER (S/11013) INFORMING SC EGYPT REQUESTED IMMEDIATE EVACUATION OF UN MILITARY OBSERVERS TO CAIRO, AND AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING HE ASKED COUNCIL MEMBERS TO CONSULT WITH HIM REGARDING IT. SC ADJOURNED AT 7:30 AND NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 3:30PM, OCT 9.

SCALI STATED REPORTS FROM UN SOURCES APPEARED INDICATE ATTACKS IN GOLAN HEIGHTS INITIATED BY SYRIAN MIG AIRCRAFT AND FIRST FIRING ON SUEZ FRONT, AT SAME TIME AS SYRIAN ATTACK, WAS FROM WEST TO EAST. ON INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE OUTBREAK US TOOK INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IMMEDIATELY IN HOPES OUTBREAK MIGHT BE PREVENTED. GIVEN SITUATION, US FELT IT COULD NOT FAIL TO EXERCISE ITS RESPONSIRILITIES AS PERM SC MEMBER. US PROPOSED NOT ASSESS RESPONSIBILITY, BUT HELP PROMOTE SOLUTION. THERE WERE THREE PRINCIPLES SC MUST SPEK TO APPLY: MILITARY OPERATIONS MUST BE HALTED; CONDITIONS IN AREA MUST BE RESTORED THAT WOULD BE CONDUCIVE TO SETTLEMENT OF LONGSTANDING DIFFERENCES IN AREA, AND "LEAST DAMAGING WAY TO BRING THIS ABOUT" WOULD BE FORE PARTIES CONCERNED TO RETURN TO POSITIONS BEFORE HOSTILITIES BROKE OUT; AND FOUNDATIONS SO LABORIOUSLY ACHIEVED IN PAST FOR NETOTIATIONS LOOKING TOWARD PEACE MUST NOT BE DESTROYED UNDER STRESS OF MILITARY EMERGENCY.

EGYPTIAN FONMIN EL-ZAYYAT CHARGED ISRAEL ATTACKED EGYPTIAN FORCES OCT. 8, AND EGYPTIANS COUNTER-ATTACKED ACROSS SUEZ AND HOISTED THEIR FLAG ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY. QUESTIONING US REFERENCE TO UN REPORTS, HE DECLARED NO UN OBSERVERS AT EL ZAAFARANA AND EL SUKHNA TO WITNESS ISRAELI ATTACKS. HE CLAIMED CEASEFIRE RESES ONLY TEMPORARY AND AFTER 90-DAY EXPIRATION EGYPT STATED IT WAS NO LONGER BOUND BY CEASEFIRE. IF "RETURN TO POSITIONS BEFORE HOSTILITIES BROKE OUT" MEANT RETURN TO 1967 BORDERS, HE AGREED, BUT ANY OTHER INTERPRETATION WAS INVITATION FOR ONE STATE TO OCCUPY ANOTHER.

HUANG HUA (CHINA) SAID ISRAELI ZIONISTS, "WITH CONNIVANCE AND SUPPORT OF SUPERPOWERS" HAD BEEN "FRANTICALLY PURSUING POLICY OF AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION OVER LONG PERIOD" AND OCT 6 LAUNCHED FRESH MILITARY ATTACKS AGAINST EGYPT, SYRIA AND PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS. IT WAS "PERFECTLY JUST" FOR ARAB COUNTRIES TO "RISE IN RESISTANCE TO INVADING ENEMIES ON THEIR OWN SACRED TERRITORIES." HE DESCRIBED AS "PREPOSTEROUS" PROPOSAL EGYPT AND SYRIA WITHDRAW TO THEIR POSITIONS PRIOR TO COUNTER-ATTACK, AND SAID IF SC TO ADOPT ANY RES IT SHOULD CONDEMN ISRAELI ZIONIST AGGRESSION AND SUPPORT ARAB PEOPLES.

ISRAELI FONMIN EBAN EMPHASIZED ALL AVENUES TO PEACE TRIED EXCEPT NEGOTIATIONS, NOTED ISRAEL SENT LETTER TO SC ABOUT ATTACK BY EGYPT AND SYRIA, HOPED EGYPTIAN FONMIN WOULD BRING SOME EVIDENCE OF HIS "ODIUS FALSEHOOD" OF ISRAELI

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PAGE 02

TDR:282/12:26Z

DTG:090711Z OCT 73

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*****U C L A S S I F I E D ***** S C O P Y

ATTACK WHICH THEY BOTH KNEW NEVER HAD TAKEN PLACE, AND SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS SC FURTHER AT FUTURE MEETING.

MAITLAND(UK) NOTED FIGHTING IN THAT VITALLY IMPORTANT AREA CARRIED WITH IT "GRAVE RISKS THAT CONFLAGRATION WILL SPREAD." SUPPORTED

SC RES 242, AND SUGGESTED SC HAD RESPONSIBILITY TO: 1) ISSUE URGENT CALL FOR CESSION OF FIGHTING, AND 2) "TREAT THESE TRAGIC EVENTS AS CATALYST FOR STARTING GENUINE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT."

MALIK (USSR) DID NOT REGARD IT AS APPROPRIATE TO CONVENE SC NOW, SUPPORTED "VICTIMS OF AGGRESSION", CONSIDERED THEIR WISH TO "DRIVE OUT FOREIGN OCCUPIERS" LEGITIMATE, AND MENTIONED "REACTIONARY CIRCLES" AND ISRAEL'S "PATRONS." HE SAID NO NEW SC DECISIONS REQUIRED BUT ONLY IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUS ONES, AND CONCLUDED THAT WITHOUT CLEARCUT STATEMENT BY ISRAEL ON ITS READINESS TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THERE COULD BE NO CONSTRUCTIVE SC DECISION ON ME.

GA PLENARY--MIDDLE EAST, GENERAL DEBATE

GA OCT 8 AGAINST INTERRUPTED GENERAL DEBATE WHEN PRES BENITIUS (ECUADOR) STATED AT OUTSET IF THERE WAS NO OBJECTION HE WOULD GIVE TO EGYPT, SYRIA AND ISRAEL (WHO HAD SUBMITTED DOCUMENTS A/9190, A/9203, A/9204) TO MAKE STATEMENTS OF INFORMATIVE CHARACTER. RIGHTS OF REPLY WERE EXERCISED BY SAUDI ARABIA AND ZAIRE. GENERAL DEBATE STATEMENTS THEN MADE BY YEMEN, HUNGARY, DAHOMEY, JORDAN, UKRAINE, KUWAIT, BOLIVIA, SOMALIA, AND BELGIUM. DURING AFTERNOON EGYPTIAN REP INTERRUPTED DEBATE TO ANNOUNCE ISRAELIS HAD BOMBED PORT SAID.

TAKING UP GENERAL COMITE REPORT, GA APPROVED WITHOUT OBJECTION INCLUSION IN AGENDA OF: SOV-PROPOSED ITEM ON REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS OF PERM SC MEMBERS (ALLOCATED TO PLENARY); FRENCH ITEM ON EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION (SPECIAL POLITICAL COMITE); AND INCLUSION OF ARABIC AMONG UN OFFICIAL AND WORKING LANGUAGES (COMITE 5). OCT. 9 GA WILL HEAR PRES OF UPPER VOLTA, AND CONTINUE GENERAL DEBATE WITH STATEMENTS BY MALAYSIA, MALI, SRILANKA, BHUTAN, ROMANIA, MAURITIUS, CHILE, TUNISIA AND GUATEMALA.

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PSN:052421 PAGE 03 OF 03 TOR:282/12:26Z DTG:090711Z OCT 73

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ROUTINE
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DE RUEHDT #3744 2820355
R 090304Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9989

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3625
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4408
AMEMBASSY LONDON 8062
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4596
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9151
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4224
USMISSION PEKING 081
USINT CAIRO 3481
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 2064

UNCLAS USUN 3744

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF

SUBJ: US STATEMENT TO SC ON ME SITUATION

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT TO SC BY AMB. SCALI DELIVERED
LATE AFTERNOON OCTOBER 8:

MR. PRESIDENT, THE UNITED STATES HAS REQUESTED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL BE CONVENED TODAY IN ORDER THAT IT MIGHT DEAL URGENTLY WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MORE THAN THREE YEARS, ARMED HOSTILITIES HAVE BROKEN OUT ON A MASSIVE SCALE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE CEASEFIRE WE HAVE STUGHT TO MAINTAIN HAS BEEN BROKEN. THE RE COURSE TO TRAGIC VIOLENCE WE HAVE STUGHT TO AVOID IS UPON US.

REPORT BASED ON UNITED NATIONS SOURCES APPEAR TO INDICATE THAT THE AIR ATTACKS IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS WERE INITIATED BY SYRIAN MIG AIRCRAFT AND THAT THE FIRST FIRING ON THE SUEZ FRONG, WHICH TOOK PLACE AT THE SAME TIME AS THE SYRIAN ATTACK, WAS FROM WEST TO EAST. THE SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIGHTING HAS BEEN FULLY COVERED IN THE PRESS.

IN THE DAYS BEFORE FIGHTING BROKE OUT, WE RECEIVED REPORTS OF INTENSIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN AREA. WE WATCHED THESE DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY, BUT UNTIL A FEW HOURS BEFORE MILITARY OPERATIONS STARTED, WE WERE UNABLE TO CONCLUDE THAT THESE ACTIVITIES WERE A PRELUDE TO ACTUAL FIGHTING.

*Scali statement
as delivered*

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THIS IS A REGION IN WHICH ALARMS AND ALERTS ARE FAIRLY FREQUENT. IN THEMSELVES, MILITARY MOVEMENTS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY INDICATE THAT COMBAT WAS ABOUT TO BEGIN. WHEN, VERY SHORTLY BEFORE THE INITIAL ATTACKS TOOK PLACE, WE RECEIVED INDICATIONS THAT THIS WAS THE FACT, WE IMMEDIATELY UNDERTOOK INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN HOPE THAT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES MIGHT BE PREVENTED. WE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION DIRECTLY WITH ISRAEL AND EGYPT. WE CONSULTED OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS AND EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED ON THIS COUNCIL. OTHERS IN AND OUTSIDE OF THE AREA PURSUED PARALLEL EFFORTS. WE KEPT IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM WHO ALSO LENT HIS GREAT WEIGHT AND PRESTIGE TO THE EFFORTS. UNFORTUNATELY THESE EFFORTS DID NOT PREVENT THE OUTBREAK, AND INTENSE FIGHTING CONTINUES.

IN SO SERIOUS A SITUATION WE FELT THAT WE COULD NOT FAIL TO EXERCISE OUR RESPONSIBILITY, AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO REQUEST A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL IN ORDER THAT IT MIGHT BE SEIZED OF THE GRAVE SITUATION WHICH HAD ARisen. NOT TO HAVE DONE THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN TO FAIL IN OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER. WE HOPE THAT IN THE DAYS AHEAD THE COUNCIL BY ITS DELIBERATION CAN RESTORE IN THE MOST CRITICAL AND EXPLOSIVE AREA IN THE WORLD.

DEFINITIVE JUDGEMENTS AS TO CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION ARE DIFFICULT IN VIEW OF THE FLUIDITY OF THE SITUATION. MY GOVERNMENT HAS ITSELF MADE NOT SUCH JUDGMENTS. NOR HAVE WE FELT IT WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE TO DIVERT THE COUNCIL'S ENERGIES AND ATTENTION TO THE QUESTION OF ASSESSING BLAME.

OUR PURPOSE TODAY IS NOT TO SIFT CONFLICTING REPORTS OR TO ASSESS RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT HAS OCCURRED. OUR PURPOSE IS TO HELP PROMOTE A SOLUTION FOR THE TENSE AND DANGEROUS SITUATION CONFRONTING US.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEPARATE PROXIMATE FROM UNDERLYING CAUSES. THE FORMER MAY BE CLEARCUT, BUT THE LATTER ARE COMPLEX, AND PERCEPTIONS OF RIGHT AND WRONG INEVITABLY VARY. IT HAS BEEN OVER SIX YEARS SINCE THE PRESENT ABNORMAL SITUATION WAS CREATED IN THE WAKE OF THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. THAT WAS IN TURN FOLLOWED EIGHTEEN YEARS OF ABNORMAL ARMISTICE. FOR THE FAILURE TO MOVE FROM A NORMAL ARMISTICE AND CEASEFIRE TO POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION AND PEACE, THERE IS MORE THAN ENOUGH BLAME TO GO AROUND. ALL CONCERNED HAVE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE THE TRANSITION OVER THE PAST 25 YEARS.

WE HAVE GIVEN PRELIMINARY THOUGHT TO THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THIS COUNCIL MIGHT MOVE IN DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM, SO THAT NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE PRACTICAL PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE CAN BE CREATED, AND THE PRESENT TRAGEDY CAN BE MADE A NEW BEGINNING RATHER THAN SIMPLY ANOTHER LOST OPPORTUNITY. AS WE SEE IT, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PRINCIPLES WHICH THE COUNCIL MUST SEEK TO APPLY.

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FIRTS, IN SITUATION WHERE FITHTING IS RAGING UNCHECKED, THE MOST APPROPRIATE MEANS MUST BE FOUND FOR BRINGING THE HOSTILITIES TO AN END. MILITARY OPERATIONS MUST BE HALTED. 5*3 &7, .75 !-)) 8)3,5 5 5--5 -\$\$8589,-) #7.-, 7!!348,8 .-6 ?3 -;98\$3\$ AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE MAY PROCEED.

SECOND, CONDITIONS MUST BE RESTORED IN THE AREA THAT WOULD BE CONDUCTIVE TO A SETTLEMENT OF THE LONG-STANDING DIFFERENCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE HUST BE RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS AND POSITIONS OF ALL THE STATES IN THE REGION. A BEGINNING MUST BE

MADE TOWARD CONVERTING THE SHARP CONFRONTATION OF VIOLENTLY OPPOSING CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS, WHICH FOR OVER A QUARTER OF A CENTURY HAS MADE TRUE STABILITY IMPOSSIBLE, TO A MORE REASONED DISCOURSE AIMED AT GENUINE RECONCILIATION. THE LEAST DAMAGING WAY TT BRING THIS ABOUT IS TO HAVE THE PARTIES CONCERNED RETURN TO THE POSITIONS BEFORE HOSTILITIES BROKE OUT.

THIRD, IN ALL ITS EFFORTS THE COUNCIL MUST BE MINDFUL TF THE NED FOR UNIVERSAL RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THOSE INSTRUMENTS AND P INCIPLES OF SETTLEMENT FOR THE MIEDLE EASTERN DISPUTE WHICH HAVE RECEIVED THE ADHE ENCE OF THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND THE SUPPORT OF THE COUNCIL'S AUTHORITY. THE FOUNDATIONS ST LABORIOUSLY ACHIEVED IN THE PAST FOR NEGOTIATIONS LOOKING TOWARD A MIDDLE EASTERN PEACE MUST NOT BE DESTROYED UNDER THE STRESS OF A MILITARY EMERGENCY.

THESE PRINCIPLES, IN THE OPINION OF MY GOVERNMENT, CONSTITUTE THE S AMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE IAN ACT IN THIS COUNCIL TO REDUCE THE PREPAILING TENSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO PREPARE FOR A REINVIGORATION OF THE PROCESS OF PEACEMAKING. WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE PRINCIPLES, AND A Y OTHERS WHICH OTHER MEHBE S MAY PUT FORWARD, AS A BASIS FOR TUR FURHTE ACTION.

WHAT WE SEEK IN THIS COUNCIL IS NOT A WAR OF WORDS, BUT A BROAD CONSENSUS WHICH WILL ENABLE THE COUNCIL TO PUT THE FULL WEIGHT TF ITS INFLUENCE BEHIND THE TASK OF RESTORING PEACE, ST THAT THE MIDDLE EAST CAN BE SET ON A NEW COURSE POINTING TOWARD A BETTER ERA IN THE REGION.

LET US THE RENDOUNCE THE STERILE GAINS OF PROPAGANDA AND TURN TO SERIOUS DISCUSSION. THE SITUATION IS URGNET; THE NEED IS GREAT, AND TIME P ESES. UNQUOTE

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ROUTINE
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R 090300Z OCT 73
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9987

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4406
AMEMBASSY LONDON 8060
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4594
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4222
USLO PEKING 079
USINT CAIRO 3479
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3623
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9149
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 2062

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USUN 3742
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: UN XF PFOR SC
SUBJ: SC MEETING ON ME

1. WHEN SC MEETING FINALLY CONVENED SHORTLY AFTER 6:00 PM, OCT 8, AGENDA WAS APPROVED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND AMB SCALI DELIVERED US STATEMENT TO PACKED HOUSE. FULL TEXT SEPTEL.

2. EGYPTIAN FONMIN EL-ZAYYAT'S STATEMENT WAS HASTY PASTE-UP JOB, KEYED TO SCALI STATEMENT BUT WITH FIRE CONCENTRATED ON ISRAELIS. HE CHALLENGED IDEA THAT LEGAL CEASEFIRE IN EXISTENCE, ALLEGING THAT CEASEFIRE HAD ONLY BEEN PRESCRIBED FOR NINETY-DAY PERIOD AND HAD BEEN FORMALLY RENOUNCED BY EGYPT. NO LEGAL CEASEFIRE LINE EXISTED. EL-ZAYYAT CHALLENGED US INTERPRETATION OF UN SOURCES ON INITIATION HOSTILITIES AND PLACED BLAME ON ISRAELIS. HE WELCOMED SCALI RECOGNITION, IN HIS STATEMENT AND IN HIS LETTER REQUESTING SC MEETING, THAT SC HAD RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DEALING WITH ME. IF SCALI'S PHRASE "RETURN TO THE POSITIONS BEFORE HOSTILITIES BROKE OUT" HAD MEANT RETURN TO 1967 BORDERS, EL-ZAYYAT FULLY AGREED. IF IT MEANT ANYTHING ELSE, IT WAS INVITATION FOR ONE COUNTRY TO OCCUPY

QUANDT, HORAN

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ANOTHER'S TERRITORY.

3. ISRAELI FMNMIN EBAN EFFECTIVELY MADE BRIEF AND UPBEAT RESPONSE TO EL-ZAYYAT, EMPHASIZING THAT ALL AVENUES TO PEACE HAD BEEN TRIED EXCEPT NEGOTIATIONS. ERAN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK AT GREATER LENGTH LATER, AFTER STUDYING SCALI AND EL-ZAYYAT STATEMENTS.

4. AS PROMISED, BRITISH STATEMENT WAS HELPFUL ONE, COMPATIBLE WITH US POSITION.

5. CHINESE PERMREP HUANG HUA VOICED ALL OUT SUPPORT FOR ARABS. HE BLAMED MACHINATIONS OF TWO SUPER-POWERS FOR TROUBLES IN ME. STATEMENT WAS LARGELY REHASH OF EARLIER PRONOUNCEMENTS.

6. SOVS (MALIK) ALSO SUPPORTED ARABS, WITH ONLY INDIRECT REFERENCES TO US AS "REACTONARY CIRCLES" AND "PATRONS" OF ISRAELI AGGRESSORS. MALIK IDENTIFIED ISRAEL AS AGGRESSOR AND ARABS AS VICTIMS OF AGGRESSION, BUT AVOIDED JUDGMENT AS TO WHO STARTED PRESENT ROUND OF HOSTILITIES. HE CONCLUDED THAT SC COULD TAKE NO ACTION UNLESS KEY PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS IMPLEMENTED.

7. IN LATER SC CONSULTATIONS, NEXT MEETING OF SC ON ME SCHEDULED FOR 3:30 PM, OCT 9.

SCALI

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9940

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3620
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4218
AMEMBASSY BIEIUT IMMEDIATE 4403
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9147
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4589
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8058
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 2060
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3476

UNCLAS USUN 3715

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR UN ME

SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST DEBATE IN GA: ABBA EBAN

~~SECRET EDITION EASY DECODE IN CAV ABBA EBAN~~
SUMMARY: IN SHORT GA STATEMENT ON MES ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER ABBA EBAN
CHARGED EGYPT AND SYRIA WITH VIOLATING 1967 CEASEFIRE LINE. HE
STRONGLY REPUDIATED EGYPTIAN CHARGES THAT FIGHTING ERUPTED AS
RESULT OF ATTEMPTED SURPRISE ATTACK ON EGYPTIAN INSTALLATIONS
BY ISRAELI NAVY. EBAN CALLED FOR CEASE FIRE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
RESTORATION OF 1967 CEASEFIRE LINES.

Abba Eban
at UN 10/8

1. EBAN DECLARED THAT EVERYONE KNOWS THAT SYRIA AND EGYPT HAVE INFILCTED "HEAVY BLOW TO CAUSE OF INT'L PEACE" AND ACCUSED THE TWO GOVTS OF EMBARKING ON A PREMEDITATED AND UNPROVOKED ASSAULT ON ISRAEL ON ITS MOST SACRED DAY. FONMIN CALLED ASSAULTS A VIOLATION OF THE 1967 CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND A VIOLATION OF INT'L LAW. HE LAMENTED THAT ISRAEL HAD SUFFERED "TRAGIC LOSS OF LIFE", BUT EGYPT AND SYRIA HAD SUFFERED MORE. FONMIN DECLARED THAT ISRAEL HAS RESOLVED TO FRUSTRATE THESE ACTS OF AGGRESSION BECAUSE IF SUCCESSFUL, THEY WOULD BE A SEVERE BLOW TO PEACE. ISRAEL WAS SUCCESSFULLY REPELLING EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FORCES AND THEIR ADVANTAGE WOULD BE SHORT-LIVED.

2. REPUDIATING EGYPTIAN CHARGES OF A SURPRISE ISRAELI ATTACK, EBAN RECOUNTED THAT THE GOI RECEIVED "AUTHENTIC" INFORMATION THAT

SCOWCROFT, LL

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THERE WOULD BE A JOINT EGYPTIAN/SYRIAN MILITARY ATTACK AT 4:00 AM, OCT 6. TWO HOURS LATER A NUMBER OF DIPLOMATIC REPS, INCLUDING AMERICAN AMB, IN TEL AVIV WERE INFORMED OF THIS IN HOPE THAT THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO INTERCEDE. ISRAEL, HF ASSERTED, REFUSED TO TAKE ANY PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION EVEN THOUGH IT REALIZED THE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT DOING SO. FONMIN DECLARED EGYPT "INVENTED AN IMAGINARY SEA BATTLE, AT AN IMAGINARY PLACE AND AT AN IMAGINARY TIME" WHICH TOOK PLACE AFTER KNOWLEDGE THAT ITS INVASION PLAN WAS KNOWN TO MANY. FONMIN ASSERTED THAT NEITHER EGYPTIANS NOR SYRIANS HAVE ANY PROOF THAT THIS IMAGINARY BATTLE TOOK PLACE AND ASKED RHETORICALLY WHY ISRAEL WOULD LAUNCH AN ATTACK AGAINST EITHER COUNTRY ON THIS DAY OF ATONEMENT, A DAY WHEN BOTH INT'L AND NATIONWIDE COMMUNICATION IS VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT AND THE NATION'S VIGILANCE IS AT ITS LOWEST.

3. FONMIN NOTED THERE WERE SEVERAL LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THIS SITUATION: ISRAEL CANNOT TAKE ITS SECURITY FOR GRANTED: EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN THREATS MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, AND SAFE AND SECURE BOUNDARIES ARE IMPORTANT. ELABORATING ON THE LAST POINT, HF PREDICTED THAT MAJOR PARTS OF CENTRAL ISRAEL WOULD HAVE BEEN ATTACKED AND MASSACRE ENSUED IF ISRAEL HAD RETURNED EARLIER TO 1967 BOUNDARIES AS MANY HAD URGED BE DONE.

4. EBAN ANNOUNCED THAT TASK AT HAND IS TWO-FOLD: A) TO OBTAIN A CEASEFIRE AND B) TO RESTORE THE (1967) CEASEFIRE LINES WHICH WERE SUBJECT OF "PREVIOUS INT'L AGREEMENT" BY PARTIES CONCERNED. HF DECLARED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE ONLY WAY TO ALTER THE 1967 CEASEFIRE LINE.

5. IN COURSE OF SPEECH EBAN MADE SHARP REFERENCES TO ZAIRE, NON-ALIGNED, ETC., WHICH WE EXPECT WILL BE MUCH RESENTED AND TEND TO ISOLATE ISRAEL EVEN FURTHER IN UN. REPORT BY SEPTEL.
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9959

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4217
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3619
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 4402
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8057
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9146
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4588
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 2059
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3475

UNCLAS USUN 3714

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, ME, XF
SUBJ: EGYPTIAN STATEMENT IN UNGA ON ME

Zayyat remarks

at UN 10/8

1. FONMIN EL-ZAYYAT EXPLAINED THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS CAPITAL FORCED HIM TO ARRIVE LATE TO GA DISCUSSION THIS MORNING. HE ANNOUNCED THAT EGYPTIAN FORCES HAD CROSSED EAST BANK OF SUEZ AND HAD HOISTED EGYPTIAN FLAG AND THAT SYRIANS ARE SUCCESSFULLY HOLDING GOLAN FRONT. REFERRING TO HIS OCT. 6 CONVERSATION WITH SYG AND SUBSEQUENT CIRCULATED LETTER, HE REPEATED ISRAEL HAD BEGUN STRIKE ALONG EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN LINES.
2# EBAN, HE SAID, HAD CALLED THIS "LIE" ON MEDIA AND IN CONTEXT OF "LYING" EL-ZAYYAT PROCEEDED TO REFUTE WITH FOLLOWING POINTS
EBAN OCT. 3 GENERAL DEBATE STATEMENT: A) ISRAEL HAD NOT ACCEPTED AMB. JARRING MEMO AND TO SAY SO IS GROSS OMISSION AND DISTORTION; B) ISRAEL HAD NOT COOPERATED WITH FOUR AFRICAN PRESIDENTS WHO VISITED IN 1971 AND PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S BREAKING OF RELATIONS STATEMENT IS PROOF OF FACT; C) ISRAEL HAS NOT ABSTAINED FROM CHANGING JURIDICAL, POLITICAL CHARACTER OF TERRITORY AND HAS ANNEXED JERUSALEM AND SAID FUTURE IS UNNEGOTIABLE; AND D) ISRAEL IS NOT OPEN TO NEGOTIATION AND ON CONTRARY, ISRAEL WANTS TO PARTITION EGYPT, JORDAN AND SYRIA, KEEPING PARTS OF TERRITORY IT NOW HOLDS.

3. FONMIN DESCRIBED ACTIONS OF EGYPT AND SYRIA AS SELF-DEFENSE AND

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TOLD COMMUNITY THAT ARABS CANNOT SUFFER CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF THEIR TERRITORY AND TRAMPLING OF UN CHARTER IN SILENCE. IN SIX YEAR HISTORY, UN, GA, SC HAVE REJECTED TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION BY FORCE. HE CALLED FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS WHICH HE SAID WAS ORIGINAL POSITION OF MOST COUNTRIES (SINGLING LA'S, PARTICULARLY ECUADOR, BENITES' COUNTRY) DURING 1967 GA DISCUSSIONS AND, HE SAID, THIS POSITION HAS BEEN RECONFIRMED OVER YEARS. HE REVIEWED POSITIVE GOE RESPONSES TO PEACE INITIATIVES OVER LAST FOUR YEARS, PARTICULARLY RESPONSES TO JARRING, FOUR POWER TALKS, 1970 90-DAY CEASEFIRE INITIATIVE AND EXTENSION OF DATE CONTINUALLY AGREED TO BY GOE, JARRING FEB. 4 MEMO. TO ALL INITIATIVES, ISRAEL HAS RESPONDED WITH HEIGHTENED AGGRESSIONS.

4. EL-ZAYYAT SAID GOE HAS RAISED QUESTION WHETHER UN IS DETERMINED TO END WAR OR WHETHER THROUGH INACTION IT HAS PROLONGED IT. IN BELIEF OF POSITIVE ACTION, GOE ASKED FOR SC MEETING THIS SUMMER. STATES AND VOTES OF SC MEMBERS SHOWED THAT WITH EXCEPTION OF US ALL NATIONS DEPLORED ISRAELI CONTINUED OCCUPATION. LACK OF RESPONSE TO JARRING MEMO AND RECONFIRMED THEIR RESPECT FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES. US "SADLY" VOTED AGAINST RES AND BECAUSE OF SC INABILITY TO ACT DUE TO US, ISRAEL HAS FURTHER ESCALATED ITS AGGRESSION, CITING SEPT. 15 ACTION AND NOW OCT. 6.

5. IN CONCLUSION, EL-ZAYYAT SAID HIS GOVT TAKES HEART FROM HISTORY OF MOST COUNTRIES IN GA CHAMBER WHO HAD TO FIGHT TO END AGGRESSION AND OCCUPATION. "HISTORY OF NATIONS HERE TELLS US THE MIGHTY CAN BE DEFEATED" AND JUSTICE WILL PREVAIL. QUOTING FRENCH FONMIN'S RECENT QUESTION, IF ONE ATTEMPTS TO PUT ONE'S FOOT BACK IN ONE'S HOME IS THAT AGGRESSION, EL-ZAYYAT LABELLED CURRENT FIGHTING AS ACT OF LIBERATION AND ASKED FOR UN'S SUPPORT. HE ENDED WITH COMMENT THAT HE EXPECTED "TAKE UP ITEM ON MIDDLE EAST IN DUE COURSE" AND DID NOT WANT DEBATE NOW.

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2763

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3181

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOV 12335

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, UR, XF
SUBJ: SOVIET STATEMENT ON MIDDLE EAST

Soo. Statement
in M.E.

m m.E

1. GOVERNMENT STATEMENT PUBLISHED CENTRAL PRESS OCTOBER 8
CONDEMNS ISRAELI "EXPANSIONIST POLICY" AND SUPPORTS ARAB DEMANDS
FOR LIBERATION OF TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967. BUT, IN
CONTRAST TO INITIAL SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT REACTING TO
1967 WAR, THE PRESENT STATEMENT DOES NOT RPT NOT SPEAK OF
RESERVING SOVIET RIGHT TO TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES.

2. ALTHOUGH STATEMENT PLACES FULL BLAME ON ISRAEL FOR SITUATION LEADING TO FLAREUP, IT STOPS JUST SHORT OF DIRECTLY ACCUSING ISRAEL OF ATTACKING FIRST. INSTEAD IT NOTES RECENT ISRAELI CONCENTRATION OF FORCES ALONG CEASEFIRE LINE AND CALL-UP OF RESERVISTS. IT ASSERTS THAT BY THESE ACTIONS ISRAEL HEATED UP SITUATION AND "UNLEASHED MILITARY ACTIVITIES," BUT IT REFRAINS FROM REPEATING SOVIET NEWS STORY CLAIMS THAT ISRAEL ATTACKED ARABS.

3. MEASURED TONE OF STRONG POLITICAL SUPPORT COMBINED WITH ARMS-LENGTH ATTITUDE TOWARD INVOLVEMENT CAN BE SEEN IN BRIEF REFERENCE TO ME SITUATION OBVIOUSLY TACKED ON TO OCTOBER 8 PRAVDA ARTICLE BY DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO. GRECHKO TERMS CONFLICT "DIRECT CONSEQUENCE" OF ISRAELI EXPANSIONIST POLICY AND MILITARY PROVOCATIONS, BUT HE TOO BEGS THE QUESTION OF WHO ATTACKED WHOM. SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUSLY, BUT IN TERMS WE WOULD REGARD AS DOVISH FOR GRECHKO, HE GOES ON TO CALL ON PEACELOVING PEOPLES TO BE VIGILANT AGAINST INTRIGUES OF ENEMIES OF PEACE AND TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO PREVENT WAR FROM BREAKING OUT IN ANY CORNER OF THE WORLD.

HAK, SCOWCROFT, LL, QUANDT, SFELDT

PSN:050955

PAGE 01

TDR:281/09:48Z DTG:080919Z OCT 73

*****C N F I D E N T I A L*****S C O P Y

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY

4. NEITHER GOVERNMENT STATEMENT NOR SOVIET PRESS GIVES INDICATION OF SOVIET TACTICS IN UN, AND WE ASSUME AT THIS STAGE USSR IS TAKING ITS CUE FROM EGYPT.

DUBS
BT

PSN:050955 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:281/09:48Z DTG:080919Z OCT 73

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY

S E C R E T

***** S C O P Y

73 was

OP IMMED /ROUTINE
DTA714
DE RUEHDT #3712 2811858
O R 081849Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9957

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 8056

S E C R E T USUN 3712

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: UN, XF, UK, PFOR

SUBJ: ME IN SC: UK DRAFT RES

1. UKUN (STRICTLY PROTECT) HAS PASSED US LANGUAGE WHICH
LONDON HAS PROPOSED AS POSSIBLE BASIS FOR COMPROMISE SC RES.
BRITISH HAVE NO INTENTION OF TALKING BEFORE OCTOBER 9, AND
THEN ONLY AFTER CONSULTING WITH USG. THEY ASKED,
IN RETURN, THAT US CONSULT WITH HMG BEFORE INTRODUCING
RES OF ITS OWN.

2. FOLLOWING IS GIST OF BRITISH DRAFT:
SC WOULD CALL FOR "IMMEDIATE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES IN
ORDER TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH RAPID PROGRESS COULD BE
MADE TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SC
RFS 242."]

3. NUMBER OF SC MEMBERS, INCLUDING FRENCH, ARE PREDICTING
FOLLOWING SC SCENARIO: US WILL TABLE RES CALLING FOR
CEASE-FIRE IN CONJUNCTION WITH RETURN TO OCTOBER 6 LINES,
NON-ALIGNED WILL RESPOND BY CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL TO
JUNE 67 BOUNDARIES, LATTER RES WILL OBTAIN MAJORITY, AND
US WILL VETO. IT IS THIS OUTCOME THAT UK DRAFT IS DESIGNED
TO AVOID.

SCALI

BT

Scali reports UK
draft of UN

10/8

PSN:051565 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:281/20:05Z DTG:081849Z OCT 73

S E C R E T

*****S C O P Y

***** →

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73 war

OR IMMED
ESA 87KGA220
DE RUESKG #5363 2811759
O 081730Z OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9627

S E C R E T AMMAN 5363

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, JO
SUBJ: COOLING OFF THE KING

1. I WILL SEE KING AND PM IN MORNING. *Instruction*
 2. SEND ME A FLASH CABLE TIMED FOR ABOUT 0700 ZULU SETTING FORTH OUR VIEWS. MAKE IT CANDID. GIVE ME THE LATEST INFO AND FACTS I NEED TO COOL HIM OFF IF, AS I SUSPECT, THE OTHERS ARE GETTING TO HIM WITH THEIR APPEALS FOR JORDANIAN INTERVENTION. DON'T FORGET HOW HE ACTED IN 1967 EVEN WHEN HE KNEW IN HIS HEART THAT IT WOULD BE A HOPELESS GESTURE.
 3. IF WE WANT TO BE MILDLY THREATENING, I'LL DO IT.
 4. LET ME HAVE AS WELL HOW WE SEE APPEAL FOR CEASEFIRE GOING. IF NEWS IS SUCH THAT HE WON'T LIKE IT, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO TELL HIM NOW THAN TO LET HIM HEAR IT FROM THIRD PARTIES WHO DO NOT HAVE SAME INTERESTS THAT WE DO.

BROWN
BT

Amb. Brown
wants us give
- instructions to
ABOUT 0700 ZULU SETTING
IVE ME THE LATEST INFO
F, AS I SUSPECT, THE OTHERS
ALS FOR JORDANIAN INTER-
IN 1967 EVEN WHEN HE
A HOPELESS GESTURE

SCOWCROFT, LL

RECALLED
PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:281/19:01Z DTG:081730Z OCT 73

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S E C R E T

*****S C O P Y

OP IMMEDIATE /PRIORITY
ESAB06KGA226
DF RUESKG #5366 2811948
O P 081930Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACI IMMEDIATE 7291

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9630
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY 2453
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 2335
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 1699
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2678
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 5479
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 4708

S E C R E T AMMAN 5366

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, LE, JO
SUBJ: LEBANESE VIEWS

1. GOJ SEEMS TO BE OVER-REACTING TO BEIRUT PRESS, EVEN THOUGHT THAT PRESS REPRESENTS LITTLE OF REAL TRUTH IN LEBANON.
2. WHAT I WANT FOR KING IS A BRIEF RUNDOWN ON WHAT LEBANESE ARE THINKING. GIVE ME A CABLE BY 9 AM TOMORROW OF THE SORT THAT I CAN SHOW TO KING AND JORDANIAN LEADERS.
3. MAKE IT LOOK LIKE A REPORT TO STATE BUT TAILOR IT FOR WHAT I NEED; ONE MORE THING TO COOL THE KING.
4. SORRY FOR THIS TROUBLE AT NIGHT.
5. LET ME KNOW WHAT I CAN USE OF YOUR 11911.
BROWN
BT

PSN:051584 PAGE 01 DF 01 TOR:281/20:28Z DTG:081930Z OCT 73

S E C R E T

*****S C O P Y

73 war

*****S E C R E T *****

DATE 10/08/73

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUESAD #7847 2811045
0 081041Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0017

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3849
BT

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7847
EXDIS
DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED
E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, XF
SUBJECT: THE FOURTH ARAB-ISRAELI WAR
RFF: TEL AVIV 7816 (NOTAL)

*Kearney's current
assessment and
suggestions*

1. AS WE MOVE INTO THE THIRD DAY OF THIS WAR, I BELIEVE IT IS STILL FAIRLY CERTAIN TO SAY THAT ISRAEL IS GOING TO WIN IT.
2. TODAY IS PROBABLY THE CRITICAL DAY. IDF, WHICH MUST PUSH BACK SYRIANS BEFORE IT CAN FOCUS ON EGYPTIAN FORCES EAST OF SUEZ CANAL, FACES SERIOUS ZDS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. IF THE CLOUDY WEATHER WHICH PREVAILS THIS MORNING SHOULD INHIBIT THE USE OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE IN FULL EFFECT AGAINST THE SYRIAN ARMOR, THE ISRAELI GROUND FORCES COULD HAVE THEIR HANDS FULL, SINCE MOBILIZATION STILL ONGOING AND REINFORCEMENTS ARE NOT ALL IN PLACE. AS A RESULT, THE WAR COULD LAST LONGER AND COULD COST MORE THAN WE HAD THOUGHT YESTERDAY.
3. ONE THING IS BECOMING CLEAR: ISRAELI CASUALTIES ON BOTH FRONTS ARE MOUNTING. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS FACTOR IS IMPLIED IN THE FACT THAT THE GOI IS NOT TELLING ITS PEOPLE ABOUT IT (NOR IS IT GIVING US HARD INFO ON THE SUBJECT). I BELIEVE THAT WHEN THE FULL IMPACT IS FELT IN ISRAEL ON THE BLOOD THIS WAR WILL HAVE COST, THE GOI'S POLITICAL OPTIONS MAY BE REDUCED: THE NATION WILL EXPECT A DECISIVE WAR OUTCOME AND A POSTWAR SITUATION WHICH LOOKS SECURE FOR ISRAEL.
4. ANOTHER THING WHICH THE GOI IS SHIELDING ITS PUBLIC FROM IS THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE DIFFICULTIES THE IDF IS FACING. OBVIOUSLY

*****S E C R E T *****

*****S E C R E T *****

DATE 10/08/73

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE GOI'S FIRST CONSIDERATION IN DOING SO IS THE MAINTENANCE OF MORALE. A SECONDARY CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE JORDAN: SURELY THE ISRAELIS APPRECIATE THAT JORDAN (WITH MEMORIES OF 1967) DOES NOT BELIEVE SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN MILITARY COMMUNIQUES AND IS MORE INCLINED TO ACCEPT THE ISRAELI VERSION AS ACCURATE. KEEPING JORDAN OUT OF THE WAR MUST BE HIGH ISRAELI PRIORITY.

5. AS SOON AS WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF HOW LONG THE WAR IS GOING TO LAST AND WHAT IT IS GOING TO COST ISRAEL, WE WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO JUDGE THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE USG CAN USEFULLY SEEK TO GUIDE ISRAELI POLICY.
KFeATING

PSN: 051033

TnR: 281/11:14Z

DTG: 081041Z OCT 73

*****S E C R E T *****

*****C N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY

73 war

PRIORITY /ROUTINE
ESAT08TIA162
DE RUESTI #1282 2811418
P R 081400Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

To SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0616

INFO AMCONSUL STUTTGART 0080

CONFIDENTIAL TRIPOLI 1282

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AFMR LY
SUBJECT: E AND E STATUS REPORT TWO
REF: TRIPOLI 1280

Libya-
EE

1. ONLY MAJOR DEVELOPMENT LAST 24 HOURS WAS
QADHAFI'S MIDNIGHT SPEECH ON LARG ATTITUDE TOWARD
M E FIGHTING. ASSUME TEXT CARRIED BY FBIS. STRIKES
US AS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT HE HAS OPEN RESERVATIONS
RE WISDOM OF EGYPTIAN/SYRIAN ATTACK. BUT AS A DUTY
WILL SUPPORT IT, HE SAYS. HIS REFERENCE TO US SUPPORT
OF ISRAEL WITH FUNDS, ADVISERS AND DUAL NATIONAL PILOTS ARE
HARDLY MORE THAN PRO FORMA. THIS MODERATION, BY HIS STANDARDS,
COULD CHANGE OVERNIGHT IF USG MAKES AN "ANTI-ARAB" MOVE OR
SOMEONE FLOATS A BIG LIE QADHAFT WOULD SWALLOW. HIS
GULLIBILITY IS GREAT WHEN IT COMES TO US.

2. AM MEETING WITH LEADERS OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
LATER TODAY TO DISCUSS SITUATION AND CONCEPTS OF OUR E
AND E CONTINGENCY PLANS. QUITE CLEAR TO US HERE THAT, AS
PRESENTLY STAFFED, EMBASSY WILL HAVE TO SHIFT CONSIDERABLE
RESPONSIBILITIES ONTO THE COMPANIES, SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, BOTH
IN A STANDFAST AND ANY LATER CONDITION.

JOSIF
BT

PSN:051228 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:281/14:48Z DTG:081400Z OCT 73

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S E C R E T

***** S C O P Y

73 war

PRIORITY
ESA633RAA978
DE RUESRA #4350 2811140
P 081120Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 512?

INFO USCINCEUR
DIA
USMTM DHARAN

S E C R E T JIDDA 4350

SAUDI

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, SA, XF
SUBJECT: UPDATE SAUDI ARABIAN SITUATION
USMTM/DHARAN REPORTS AS OF 1425Z OCT 7 FOLLOWING INFO RE
ROYAL SAUDI AIR FORCE:
A) 20 F-5B HAVE BEEN ARMED WITH AIM 9B MISSILES AND ARE
STANDING READY AT DHARAN AIR BASE.
B) EIGHT (8) LIGHTNINGS, WITH FIRESTREAK MISSILE BAYS
OPEN (PLACING THEM IN AIR-TO-AIR CONFIGURATION RATHER THAN
AIR-TO-GROUND) ARE IN READY STATE WITH TOTAL 21 (NORMAL
FOR DHARAN) ON STATION THERE. C) THERE IS NO INDICATION OF
ANY ACTION OTHER THAN INCREASED READINESS.
HORAN
BT

PSN:051080 PAGE 01 DF 01 TOR:281/12:06Z DTG:081120Z OCT 73

S E C R E T

*****S C O P Y

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S C O P Y

TS *man*

OP IMMED /ROUTINE
FJK007
DE R0FNRS #2172 2811105
O R 081049Z OCT 73
FM USINT ALGIERS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9674

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 0630
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2815
AMEMBASSY RABAT 2055
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 1913
USMISSION UN 0316

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ALGIERS 2172
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS/ PFOR, AG, XF
SUBJ: ALGERIAN PRESS TREATMENT OF ME CRISIS

Algeria

1. TO DATE ALGERIAN PRESS TREATMENT OF ME FIGHTING HAS
BEEN RESERVED. THERE HAVE BEEN NO ACCUSATIONS OF US INVOLVEMENT,
ALTHOUGH ONE OF REPORT OF ALLEGED SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENTS
TOWARD ME IS CARRIED BY EL MOUDIAHID OCT 8. SAME ARTICLE,
HOWEVER, REPORTS DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN STATEMENT THAT US
RESOLVED TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO BRING ABOUT CESSATION OF
FIGHTING. PRESS EMPHASIZES REPORTS THAT ISREAL INITIATED
AGGRESSION AND THAKES LINE THAT ARAB RIPOSTE HAS RESTORED
ARAB HONOR AND EQUALITY WITH ISRAEL. FURTHER EMPHASIS IS
PLACED ON ALGERIAN DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES IN SUPPORT OF
SYRIA AND EGYPT.

2. COMMENT: WE ARE STRUCK BY MEDIUM TONE OF CONTROLLED
ALGERIAN PRESS. THERE HAVE BEEN NEITHER CALLS FOR ANNIHILATION
OF ISRAEL NOR ACCUSATIONS OF ISRAEL NOR ACCUSATIONS OF DIRECT US
COMPICITY. WE SENSE THAT GDA WISHES LEAVE WAY OPEN
FOR INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS IN WHICH US
WOULD PLAY ROLE.

EAGLETON
BT

PSN:051042 PAGE 01 DF 01 TOR:281/11:22Z DTG:081049Z OCT 73

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73-11-2

OP IMMEDIATE
ES-534KGA098
DE RUE SKG #5349 2810755
0080733Z OCT 73 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9617

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 7282
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2444
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5470
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4700
USMISSION USUN NY 2581
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

Jordan

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 5349

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, JO IS
SUBJ: JORDANIANS CLAIM TO HIT OVERFLYING ISRAEL AIRCRAFT

1. AMMAN RADIO JUST BROADCAST (0800 HRS) STATEMENT BY JAF SPOKESMAN THAT SQUADRON 10 OF ISRAELI AIRCRAFT VIOLATED JORDAN AIRSPACE IN NORTHERN SECTOR APPROXIMATELY 0645: CLAIMED THAT JORDANIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS FIRED ON INTRUDERS AND ONE AIRCRAFT SEEN FALLING IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ✓

2. SUBJECT TO FURTHER CONFIRMATION, WE ASSUME REPORT OF INTRUSION CORRECT. WE CANNOT EMPHASIZE STRONGLY ENOUGH THE LIKELY ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CONTINUED ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS. AS STRESSED IN EARLIER MESSAGE, ISRAELIS CANNOT RPT CANNOT RELY ON HUSSEIN STAYING IN POWER. EVENTS OF PAST FEW DAYS SHOULD PROVE THAT ISRAELIS NOT OMNISCIENT ABOUT ARAB BEHAVIOR; SELF-INTEREST NOTWITHSTANDING. JORDAN'S KING CAN BE AS IMPULSIVE AS ANY OTHER ARAB LEADER. PERHAPS GOT SHOULD KNOW THAT ADVERSE INTERNAL PRESSURES WHICH WE PREDICTED IN EARLIER MESSAGE ALREADY MAY HAVE BEGUN TO BUILD UP. OVER LAST EIGHTEEN HOURS THERE HAS BEEN RUN ON FOOD SUPPLIES; RICE, SUGAR AND FLOUR HAVE DISAPPEARED FROM MARKETS. WHILE INDICATIONS FROM GOJ DECISION-MAKING LEVELS ARE STILL FAVORABLE, PUBLIC MOOD BEGINNING TO SHOW SIGNS OF SHIFTING. IF JORDANIAN MASSES START GETTING EMOTIONAL AND ISRAELIS CONTINUE PROVIDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, HUSSEIN'S MOVES WILL BECOME LESS PREDICTABLE. WE WOULD HOPE ISRAELIS APPRECIATE PRESENT LUXURY OF QUIESCENT JORDAN BORDER.

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TDR:281/08:16Z DTG:080733Z OCT 73

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GRAHAM
BT

PSN:050880 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:281/08:16Z DTG:080733Z OCT 73

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73 wa

OP: IMMEDIATE
DE: RUEHC #9784 2812255
082158Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: USINT CAIRO NIACI IMMEDIATE 4623
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 199784

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AFSP
SUBJ: EVACUATION
REF: (A) CAIRO 2997 (B) ATHENS 6987

*State to Cairo
Re evacuation*

1. YOU HAVE SEEN ATHENS TEL 6987 REGARDING CANCELLATION
GREEK VESSEL QUOTE CYNTHIA UNQUOTE SAILING TO ALEXANDRIA
WE WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS REGARDING LOCAL SITUATION AS IT
COULD AFFECT AMERICANS NOW IN EGYPT.

2. FROM HERE WE AGREE THAT OUR MOST SERIOUS CONCERN
SHOULD BE WITH TOURISTS IN CAIRO AND ALEXANDRIA
PARTICULARLY THOSE STAYING IN THE LARGER TOURISTS HOTELS
IN THOSE TWO CITIES. WHAT IS YOUR JUDGMENT AS TO BEST
WAY INSURE SAFETY THESE PEOPLE IF CONTRARY PRESENT
INDICATIONS, SITUATION SHOULD DETERIORATE OVER NEXT DAY
OR TWO AND ANTI-AMERICANISM BECOMES SERIOUS THREAT. WHILE
WE WILL WANT EXPLORE ALL TRANSPORTATION POSSIBILITIES IT
MAY IN FACT PROVE IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE SEA OR AIR
TRANSPORTATION OVER NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS. WOULD YOU
RECOMMEND ADVISING TOURISTS TO REMAIN IN HOTELS AND
ATTEMPT SECURE APPROPRIATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FROM
HIGH GOE OFFICIALS OR WOULD IT BE PREFERABLE DISPERSE
THEM BY ASKING RESIDENT AMERICANS TO TAKE THEM IN FOR
SHORT PERIOD. GIVE US YOUR THOUGHTS ALONG WITH HOW YOU
WOULD PLAN PROCEED.

3. WITH REGARD TO AMERICAN TOURISTS IN UPPER EGYPT WE
ARE INCLINED THINK THAT THEY ARE AS SAFE IF NOT SAFER
THERE THAN THEY WOULD BE ELSEWHERE IN EGYPT. IF YOU
AGREE YOU MAY WISH ADVISE THESE PEOPLE REMAIN WHERE
THEY ARE AND RECOMMEND THAT THEY NOT MOVE ABOUT UNLESS
IT ESSENTIAL DO SO.

4. WHAT WOULD BE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF OBTAINING GOE

PSN:051781 PAGE 01

TOR:281/23:43Z DTG:082158Z OCT 73

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APPROVAL FOR COMMERCIAL CHARTER AIRCRAFT TO MOVE
AMERICAN TOURISTS STRANDED IN EGYPT WHO WISH LEAVE,
ASSUMING SCHEDULED SERVICE REMAINS SUSPENDED FOR
PROTRACTED PERIOD OR UNMANAGEABLE BACKLOG DEVELOPS.
IN SEEKING THIS APPROVAL WE WOULD NOT DESCRIBE THIS
MOVE AS QUOTE EVACUATION UNQUOTE BUT RATHER EFFORT
ARRANGE DEPARTURE STRANDED TOURISTS.

5. YOU SHOULD NOT DISCUSS FOREGOING OUTSIDE OF USINT.
KISSINGER
BT

PSN:051781 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:281/23:43Z DTG:082158Z OCT 73

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73 war

OP IMMED /PRIORITY
SUP264R

046703Z ESA784 (LIVE MSG/MCI BEING SERVICED)
DE RUESSAD #7866 2811835
D P 081830Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 6298
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 4947
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY 3934
USMISSION USUN NY PRIORITY 3852

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 7866

EXDIS

3. D. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MOPS, XF, IS

SUBJECT: LEBANON AND MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES

REF: A. BEIRUT 11911; B. TEL AVIV DAO 081514Z OCT 73

1. AS MY DATT HAS REPORTED (REFTEL B), IDF TODAY EVINCED SOME CONCERN TO HIM OVER LEBANON-BASED FEDAYEEN SHELLINGS OF CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS IN ISRAEL DURING PAST NIGHT (REFTEL A). WHILE IT IS OBVIOUS THAT IDF HAS ITS HANDS FULL AT THIS POINT IN TIME IN COPING WITH FIGHTING AGAINST SYRIA AND EGYPT, ADDITIONAL INCIDENTS ALONG LEBANESE BORDER COULD BRING IDF TO CONSIDER SOME SORT OF ACTION AGAINST FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS IN LEBANON, SOMETHING WHICH WE CERTAINLY WANT TO AVOID.

2. BEARING IN MIND MY RECOMMENDATION IN TEL AVIV 7810 THAT WE URGE RESTRAINT ON ISRAEL WITH RESPECT TO LEBANON, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD NOW CONSIDER GOING BACK TO LEBANESE ONCE AGAIN, URGING THEM TO EXERCISE GREATER CONTROL OVER FEDAYEEN (OR AT LEAST APPEAR TO BE TRYING TO DO SO) IN ORDER TO LESSEN POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LEBANON.

KEATING

BT

Excls. Tel Aviv reports

Israel: concern building
over fedayeen shelling
from Lebanon

PSN:051566 PAGE 01 DF 01 TOR:281/20:07Z DTG:081830Z OCT 73

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OP IMMED /ROUTINE

DTB039

DF RUEHOT #3711 2811745

O R 081735Z OCT 73

FM USMISSION USUN NY

UN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9956

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4216

AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3618

USINT CAIRO 3474

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 440

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 2058

AMEMBASSY PARIS 9145

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4587

AMEMBASSY LONDON 8055

Syria at
ON

UNCLAS USUN 3711

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, XF, UN

SUBJ: SYRIAN STATEMENT IN UNGA ON ME

1. IN STATEMENT BEFORE UNGA TODAY, SYRIAN FONMIN HALIM KHADDAM CHARGED ISRAEL WITH MASSIVE ATTACK AGAINST EGYPT AND SYRIA WHICH WAS, HE SAID, PART OF PRECONCEIVED PLAN OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND TERRITORIAL EXPANSION TO MAKE EGYPT AND SYRIA ACCEPT CONDITIONS ISRAEL NOT ABLE TO IMPOSE BY ANY OTHER MEANS. FONMIN STATED ISRAELI VIOLATION OF SYRIAN AIR SPACE AND ISRAELI TROOP BUILD-UP ON SYRIAN BORDER PRIOR TO OCTOBER 6 INDICATED ISRAELI'S INTENTIONS TO ATTACK. FONMIN DESCRIBED NEW ISRAELI ATTACK AS CONSTITUTING DIRECT CHALLENGE TO INT'L COMMUNITY AND WORLD OPINION EVIDENCED IN MANY UN RESES AND RECENT OAU AND NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE STATEMENTS CONDEMNING ISRAELI EXPANSIONIST POLICY. FONMIN DECLARED SYRIA EXERCISING RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AND CALLED FOR STRICT APPLICATION OF UN CHARTER, END TO ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE, AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN AREA. FONMIN STATED LATEST NEWS FROM GOS INDICATED ISRAELI SEA ATTACK AGAINST SYRIAN PORTS (TARTOUS AND LATAKIA) WAS BEING REPULSED BY SYRIAN COAST GUARD.

SCALI

BT

PSN:051448

PAGE 01

TOR:281/18:06Z

DTG:081735Z OCT 73

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S E C R E T

***** S C O P Y

B.uxr

OP IMMEDIATE
ESA785KGA219
DE RUEKG #5362 2811755
D 081728Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9626

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 7288
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2450
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5476
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4705
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2332
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE 2586

S E C R E T AMMAN 5362

EXDIS
DEPT PASS DIA INFO IMMEDIATE
EN 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, EG, IS
SUBJ: SADAT MESSAGE TO HUSSEIN

1. ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI WAS EXTREMELY CAGEY DURING OUR FLIGHT TOGETHER AS TO EXACTLY WHAT MESSAGE HE CARRYING FROM SADAT. HE SAID THAT SADAT STILL HOLDS TO POSITION THAT IT NOT NECESSARY FOR JORDAN TO ENTER WAR AS LONG AS IT HOLDS ITS FRONT STRONGLY, THUS PREVENTING ISRAELI STRIKE THROUGH JORDAN AT SYRIA.

2. PROBLEM WITH THIS IS THAT MESSAGE REPRESENTS SADAT'S THINKING AS OF LATE SUNDAY. IT MAY ALL BE CHANGED AND HE AND ASSAD MAY BE TRYING TO PUSH JORDAN INTO THE WAR IN ORDER TO EASE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. BROWN
BT

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